Communications as Ikor

한국의 경제위기 극복 홍보 사례  < ?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

 

오늘은 좀더 재미있고 우리의 피부에 와닿는 우리나라의 사례를 하나 구경해 봅니다. IMF경제 위기 이후에 우리나라의 떨어진 국제 투자 신인도의 향상을 위해 한국 정부는 과감한 결단(?)을 내렸습니다. PR대행사를 쓰기로 한 것이지요. 정말 큰 발전이었습니다.

 

제가 이전 Bulletin에 썻던것 같이, 해외 홍보는 철저한 개념정립과 효과적인 에이젼시 관리를 통해 많은 부분을 아웃소싱해야 하는 것이 당연한겁니다. 국가 자체에서 능력이 모자라는 부분은 과감한 결단으로 외부로 부터 능력을 보충 받아야 하는 겁니다.

 

그래서 한국의 재정경제부(이 규성 장관)는 해외 투자자들의 한국에 대한 투자 신인도를 높이기 위해 해외 대행사인 버슨 마스텔러를 선택했습니다.(경쟁 P/T가 있었는지는 잘 모르겠습니다. 이 글을 읽으시는 메리트 분이 계시면 한번 알려 주시죠.)

 

이 프로젝트는 작년 2월 부터 12월 까지 약 11 개월 정도의 비교적 긴 프로그램이었고 그 프로그램 액수는 정부사업이라서 밝히지는 않지만 mid-range에 six-figures라고 하니 어렴풋이 짐작은 합니다.(사실 이액수는 기간과 프로젝트의 중요성에 비해 그리 많지 않은 액수입니다.)

 

여러분이 이 프로젝트를 구경하실때 관심을 두실것은 이 프로젝트가 economic communications, investor relations, crisis communications 과 issues management를 통합 운영한 아주 잘된 사례라는 것입니다.

 

또한 이 사례에서 우리나라의 장관도 Media Training을 받았고, 본 프로그램의 디자인 아래에서 열심히 뛰어주셨다는 게 참 다른 변화라고 생각 했습니다. “비온 뒤에 땅이 굳는다”라는 말이 맞습니다. 모두가 무언가의 중요성을 깨닫게 되었다는게 지난 우리경제 위기의 의미라 할겁니다.

 

다만 약간 아쉬운 것은 이 프로젝트가 더욱 지속적으로 이루어 져야 한다는 것입니다. 정부에서는 항상 어려울때 적극적이고, 조금 나아졌다 싶으면 수동적이 되는 PR자세를 버리고, “옷을 적시는 가랑비”의 PR을 해야합니다. 물론 우리나라의 일천한 PR경험과 역사속에서 이런 당위성을 이해하기에는 무리가 있을 수도 있지만, 몇몇 분들의 과감한 결단만 있으면 우리는 하지 않습니까.

지속적이고 일관된 커뮤니케이션적 노력이 중요합니다.

 

또한 BM의 본 케이스에서 모자람이 있다면 효과측정/평가에 있어서 프로그램 이전에 실시했던 Focus Survey를 프로그램 이후에도 실시 했었는데 얼만큼의 변화가 있었는지를 정확히 말해 주지 않았다는 것입니다. (메리트 분들중에 누구 갖고 계시나요?)

 

아무튼“, 어쨋든”, 하여간” 본 프로젝트는 우리나라 PR역사상의 기념비적인 사건이었음에는 틀림없습니다. 우리 홍보인들이 나라를 살릴수있다는 것, 매력적이지 않으십니까. 군인들은 나라를 살리기 위해 적 병사들과 싸우지만 우리는 나라를 살리기위해 눈에 보이지 않는 “Perception”과 전쟁을 합니다.

 

평소 Perception Management를 논하는 BM의 본 프로젝트는 참 괜찮았습니다.

그럼 전 먼저… “홍보!”

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Restoring Economic Confidence in Korea during the Asian Financial Crisis

Ministry of Finance & Economy with Burson-Marsteller

 

SILVER ANVIL AWARDS ’99

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OVERVIEW

By mid-December 1997, Korea faced an economic crisis triggered by the massive loss of investor confidence in Asia. In response, Korea’s first democratically elected President assembled a team of senior economic advisors to assess the situation, produce an IW supported reform plan, and restore investor confidence. However, Korea was viewed by the investment community as hostile to foreign investment, plagued by intransigent labor unions, and burdened with an economic structure dominated by inefficient conglomerates. In short, the “New Korea” had a crisis of confidence that undermined its reform program before it was able to get off the ground.

 

The financial crisis communications program for Korea sought to recapture and redirect the global dialogue on Korea and demonstrate its commitment and ability to drive through a comprehensive reform and restructuring program. This program is unique as it blends economic communications, investor relations, crisis communications and issues management expertise supported by a 24 hour, global network and geared toward the most senior level decision makers at the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE).

 

RESEARCH

 

Primary Source Research: Research benchmarked perceptions of Korea among key stakeholders: investors, bankers, U.S. and other government bodies, multilateral lending agencies, business community and financial media. An outside research organization conducted primary opinion surveys of all these publics. General findings showed respondents: 1. viewed the economic crisis as caused by structural defects in the economy and not simply a loss of investor confidence; 2. viewed the Korean Government as reacting to events rather than implementing a plan for recovery; and 3. did not believe there was a broad consensus supporting reform.

 

Global Research: Burson-Marsteller’s network undertook an exhaustive global media audit that delineated perceptual issues in major European lending countries. Research gauged overall and country-specific trends.

 

Ongoing Issue Analysis: The volatile nature of the Asian crisis required a daily read of issues facing Korea. Throughout the year, ongoing issue tracking with senior counsel was conducted in New York. During the initial crisis phase, a report and analysis of issues affecting perceptions of Korea was delivered daily. Later, research became a regular issue thermometer – commenting on views of media, academia and the investment community.

 

PLANNING

 

In the face of substantial skepticism as found by the research and a rapidly deteriorating economic position, we had an urgent need.

 

Goals: 1. Restore international confidence in the Korean economy and 2. Enable Korea to maintain positive relations with global stakeholders.

 

Target Audiences: 1. International and domestic financial community; 2. International media; 3. International economic and political policy communities.

 

Key Messages: 1. There is a clear, Korea-developed and coordinated plan to restore the country to economic health; 2. Korea has a strong financial team that has the support of the administration and private sector leadership; 3. There is a consistent and pro-business environment for foreign investment that offers a transparent and fair regulatory environment; 4. Korea is committed to providing access, timeliness and reliability of economic information and transparency in economic reporting.

 

Budget: A mid-range, six-figure program for the period from February to December 1998.  

 

EXECUTION

 

An extensive action plan was designed to first stabilize the situation, then provide the momentum to proactively communicate reform efforts to the target audiences. Successive phases of the program built on the core elements of this action plan. Following are the main tactics employed:

 

                         24 hour support base.

Burson-Marsteller immediately established a global, fully integrated team with core members in New York and Seoul and a network spanning the United States, Europe, and Asia. Team members were placed within MOFE to provide on site support.

 

                            Senior counsel.

Financial relations experts provided ongoing counsel to senior Ministry staff, including the Minster and advisors. Specific elements included seminars on interacting with the credit rating agencies, investor relations and economic communications.

 

                        Communication training.

Communication training, with an emphasis on delivering presentations to investment banks and financial audiences, was provided to senior members of the economic team, including the Minister.

 

                         Third party network.

Third party allies and spokespeople were identified. Activities included ally education, event participation and op-ed signing.

 

                   Media and stakeholder relations.

Media interviews were arranged in conjunction with key international meetings, such as the Asian Development Bank conference in Geneva. Information kits detailing the nature and elements of the reform and restructuring program were sent to media and third-party audiences. Op-eds were developed and signed by MOFE officials and the Third-party network.

 

                           Speeches.

Speeches were drafted for major forums and ensured message consistency at important events.

 

                    Foreign press briefings.

A regular press briefing program was developed for top-tier international media based in Seoul. This tactic included information materials, briefing materials, press release tracking.

 

                      Korea Economic Update.

Developed direct-to-investor publication on new developments in the Korean economy in a format similar to an investment report. The Update was distributed among institutional investors and their clients. Follow-up research confirmed that these publications were received positively.

 

                   Rapid response issues management.

On several occasions, Burson-Marsteller provided immediate support in case of crisis, such as speechwriting, presentation and press release development for the Vice Minister to clarify an issue with the World Bank during a trip to Washington.

 

                          Issues tracking.

As noted in the research segment, a major component of the program was ongoing issues tracking, which included senior counsel and rapid response recommendations when required.

 

                    Investment audience engagement.

Developed messages/materials/agendas for Government meetings, the most important of which was Korea’s first global bond offering after the crisis. This bond was seen as a key barometer of investor confidence. Elements were: a complete itinerary for Minister Lee, presentation training, speech for Korea Society dinner, backgrounder and talking points for meetings, media analysis.

 

EVALUATION

 

Burson-Marsteller’s strategic communications and consulting services fortified the Ministry’s efforts to effectively communicate the government’s stabilization and reform plan during Korea’s most serious economic crisis in 40 years. In the months following the inauguration of the President, international institutional investors, representatives of the Bretton Woods organizations, and officials from key lending countries have acknowledged the professionalism and the success of the Korean government’s impressive efforts to restore international confidence. As a result of effective communication of the government’s reform program, the macroeconomy has stabilized more quickly than any other country in East Asia. Moreover, members of the Korean government’s economic team are consistently presented in the international media as among the most steadfast reformers in the region. At the end of 90 days, we measured against the benchmark and found improvements in perceptions of Korea and its commitment to reform. And, media coverage shows that Korea has met its program goals:

 

1. Enable Korea to maintain positive relations with global stakeholders.

 

Standard & Poor’s, 1/25/99: “The restoration of an investment-grade rating reflects the government’s progress to date in corporate and financial restructuring as well as its restored external position.”

 

Barron’s, 2/20/99: “But the strongest endorsement of Korea’s improving fortunes has come from the international rating agencies … To many, the upgrades are the most important stamp of international approval for the country’s recovery efforts. It was the recognition officials in Seoul had sought to convince the world they were serious about fixing their broken economy and fragile banking system.”

 

2. Restore international confidence in the Korean economy.

 

Reuters, 4/3/98: “Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said after meeting South Korean Finance Minister Lee Kyu-Sung on Friday that he had praised South Korean success so far in stabilizing its economy.”

 

Los Angeles Times, 11/23/98: “More than any other country in the region, and certainly more than Japan, South Korea has been a model from the U.S. perspective. It has accepted International Monetary Fund medicine even when the prescription was questionable, moved to reform and recapitalize its outdated banking system, and taken steps to expand democracy, open markets and begin dismantling bloated companies and crony capitalism.”